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An End to Privacy Theater: Exposing and 
Discouraging Corporate Disclosure of 
User Data to the Government 
Christopher Soghoian* 
I. INTRODUCTION: HOW DO COMPANIES PROTECT 
THEIR CUSTOMERS’ PRIVACY? 
“Verizon has a longstanding and vigorous commitment to protecting 
its customers’ privacy and takes comprehensive steps to protect that 
privacy.”1 
 
“At Verizon, privacy is a key priority. We know that consumers will 
use the full capabilities of our communications networks only if they 
trust that their information will remain private.”2 
 
“At Google, we are keenly aware of the trust our users place in us, 
and our responsibility to protect their privacy.”3 
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 1. Letter from Randal S. Milch, Sr. Vice Pres., Verizon Bus., to John D. 
Dingell, Edward J. Markey & Bart Stupak, U.S. Reps (Oct. 12, 2007), 
available at 
http://markey.house.gov/docs/telecomm/Verizon_wiretaping_response_101207.
pdf. 
 2. Ivan Seidenberg, A Message from Verizon’s Chief Executive Officer, 
VERIZON, http://www22.verizon.com/about/privacy/letter/ (last visited Oct. 13, 
2010). 
 3. Privacy FAQs, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/privacy_faq.html (last 
Soghoian C. An End to Privacy Theater: Exposing and Discouraging 
Corporate Disclosure of User Data to the Government. Minnesota Journal 
of Law, Science & Technology. 2011;12(1):191-237. 
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“Google values our users’ privacy first and foremost. Trust is the basis 
of everything we do, so we want you to be familiar and comfortable 
with the integrity and care we give your personal data.”4 
 
“Microsoft takes customers’ privacy seriously . . . .”5 
 
“At Microsoft, we believe individuals should control the use of their 
personal information online, and should be free from fear that their 
personal and financial data will be stolen or used by others without 
their consent.”6 
Across corporate America, companies have come to 
recognize the importance of privacy. Practically every corporate 
website has a privacy policy,7 and the majority of Fortune 500 
companies have appointed Chief Privacy Officers.8 In 
statements to consumers and the press, most companies pledge 
to value, respect, and fight for their customers’ privacy. Some 
companies even claim to compete on privacy;9 most visibly, the 
major search engines that have repeatedly one-upped each 
other, adopting ever-more privacy-protecting data retention 
policies.10 
                                                          
visited Sept. 26, 2010). 
 4. Marissa Mayer, What Comes Next in This Series?  13, 33, 53, 61, 37, 
28…, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (July 3, 2008, 1:36 PM), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/07/what-comes-next-in-this-series-13-33-
53.html. 
 5. Ina Fried, Microsoft Probes Possible Privacy Snafu, CNET NEWS, (Feb. 
16, 2010, 5:40 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13860_3-10454741-
56.html?tag=contentMain;contentBody;1n. 
 6. Microsoft and Privacy, MICROSOFT (Sep. 2009), 
http://go.microsoft.com/?linkid=9688090 
 7. This is likely because of California’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 
2003. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (Deering 2010) (“An operator 
of a commercial Web site or online service that collects personally identifiable 
information through the Internet about individual consumers residing in 
California who use or visit its commercial Web site or online service shall 
conspicuously post its privacy policy on its Web site.”). 
 8. See Kenneth A. Bamberger  & Deirde K. Mulligan, Privacy on the 
Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2011) 
(manuscript at 2). 
 9. E.g., E.B. Boyd, Google Privacy Chief: ‘We Absolutely Compete on 
Privacy,’ BAYNEWSER (Jan. 29, 2010, 3:17 AM), 
http://www.mediabistro.com/baynewser/privacy/google_privacy_chief_we_absol
utely_compete_on_privacy_150406.asp). 
 10. See Richard Koman, Search Engines Compete for Privacy Bragging 
Rights, NEWSFACTOR.COM (July 24, 2007, 11:53 AM), 
http://www.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?story_id=010000TXY69E&full_skip=1 
(“After years of insisting that they should be trusted to keep users’ search 
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When companies argue that they take privacy seriously, 
compete on privacy, or are transparent about their privacy 
practices, what they are usually talking about is one limited 
aspect of privacy. That is, they are discussing their own 
collection and commercial use of customer data and the extent 
to which they share it with other companies. This is often 
motivated by a desire to avoid the ire of government regulators 
such as the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the 
European Article 29 Working Party.11 
Privacy is a bigger issue than the commercial use of data. 
Specifically, most firms are often unwilling to discuss the 
privacy threat posed by law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies’ access to their customers’ data or the degree to which 
they proactively assist, or resist, such access. Few companies 
effectively protect their customers’ data from intrusive 
government searches. Furthermore, in many cases, 
telecommunications carriers and Internet service providers 
(ISPs) that have repeatedly pledged to protect user privacy go 
out of their way to actively assist and facilitate government 
access to their customers’ most private information. 
For example, even though Verizon has a “longstanding and 
vigorous commitment to protecting its customers’ privacy,”12 
the company has argued in court that it has a First 
Amendment right to voluntarily provide information about its 
customers’ private communications to the National Security 
Agency.13 This may be a valid legal argument, but it is not the 
kind of position that a company that has pledged to protect 
users’ privacy should take. Certainly, it is not an official 
position that the company advertises to its customers on its 
website or in its privacy policy. 
                                                          
histories indefinitely, search engines are suddenly competing to limit data 
retention.”); Katherine Mangu-Ward, Search Engines Compete on Privacy, 
REASON (Aug. 13, 2007), http://reason.com/blog/2007/08/13/search-engines-
compete-on-priv (“Search engines are in an arms race to offer better privacy 
protections to the users . . . .”); Joseph Weisenthal, Search Engines Compete on 
Accuracy, Privacy Policies, TECHDIRT (July 23, 2007, 3:45 PM), 
http://techdirt.com/articles/20070723/100944.shtml (“With Google taking some 
hits over its data retention practices, its competitors are hoping that they can 
use the privacy issue to their advantage.”). 
 11. See generally Bamberger, supra note 8, at 23. 
 12. Milch, supra note 1, at 1. 
 13. Memorandum in Support of Verizon’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 
Master Consolidated Complaint at 27, In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. 
Records Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (MDL No. 06-1791 
VRW). 
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Google has made bold statements about the “trust our 
users place in us, and our responsibility to protect that 
privacy.”14 The company also has a YouTube privacy channel 
with nearly 50 videos describing the privacy features built into 
its products and one that promises that the company “makes 
privacy a priority in everything we do.”15 Absent from the 
company’s YouTube privacy channel, however, is a disclosure 
that one of the main reasons the company retains identifying 
user log data is so that it may deliver it to the government.16 
Finally, Microsoft has pledged that it takes its “customers’ 
privacy seriously.”17 However, when asked by the New York 
Times if the company was considering a policy to log no search 
data at all, Peter Cullen, Microsoft’s chief privacy strategist, 
argued that too much privacy was actually dangerous. 
“Anonymized search,” he said, “can become a haven for child 
predators. We want to make sure users have control and 
choices, but at the same time, we want to provide a security 
balance.”18 Information about the company’s commitment to 
maintaining such a “balance” by storing user data in order to 
later make it available to law enforcement agencies is nowhere 
to be found in the company’s privacy policy or anywhere else on 
the company’s website. 
This is not an attempt to pick on a few companies—the 
examples I have highlighted illustrate a widespread trend in 
the industry. With few exceptions, the companies to whom 
millions of consumers entrust their private communications are 
committed to assist in the collection and disclosure of that data 
to law enforcement and intelligence agencies—all while 
simultaneously promising to protect their customers’ privacy. 
                                                          
 14. Privacy FAQs, supra note 3. 
 15. googleprivacy, Google’s Privacy Principles, YOUTUBE (Jan. 26, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5fvL3mNtl1g. 
 16. See Interview by Robert Siegel with Eric Schmidt, CEO, Google, on 
NPR (Oct. 2, 2009), available at  
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113450803 (“[T]he 
reason we keep [search engine data] for any length of time is one, we actually 
need it to make our algorithms better but more importantly, there is a 
legitimate case of the government, or particularly the police function or so 
forth, wanting with a federal subpoena and so forth - being able to get access 
to that information.”). 
 17. Fried, supra note 5. 
 18. Brad Stone, Microsoft Offers Privacy Options for Its Search Engine, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/23/technology/23microsoftweb.html. 
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This is not to say that Microsoft, Google, and Verizon are 
hostile to user privacy—merely that when these and other 
firms speak about their commitment to protecting their 
customers’ privacy, what they really mean is that they will 
protect their customers’ data from improper access or use by 
commercial entities. The fact that these firms have a limited 
definition of privacy is not made clear to consumers, who may 
mistakenly believe that the companies to whom they entrust 
their data are committed to protecting their privacy from all 
threats, and not just those from the private sector. 
While most firms will not discuss their interactions with 
the government, it would be unfair to say that companies are 
all equal in the degree to which they assist government 
agencies and the extent to which they retain users’ private 
data—rather, they rarely discuss these differences and never 
compete on them. This article aims to shed light upon these 
rather important privacy differences among service providers, 
both technical and legal, which impact the extent to which 
government agencies can obtain users’ private data. 
Section II of this article will explore the numerous ways in 
which the technical design and implementation details of 
companies’ applications and networks can assist or frustrate 
government access to their customers’ data. While some firms 
have adopted technologies and policies that are significantly 
more privacy preserving than their competitors, few firms will 
publicly acknowledge or advertise these technical differences, 
making it almost impossible for consumers to pick a provider 
based on the degree to which their information is protected and 
retained. 
Section III delves into the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA) and, in particular, the ways in which a few 
companies have adopted aggressively pro-privacy 
interpretations of this federal law, limiting the extent to which 
government agencies can obtain user data without a court 
order. Again, just as with their engineering practices, few 
companies are willing to disclose their interpretations of ECPA 
or the extent to which they are willing to fight the government. 
This section sheds significant light on this subject and reveals 
several novel, privacy-preserving interpretations of ECPA that 
some service providers have adopted. 
Finally, Section IV seeks to address the problems that 
plague the market. Simply put, firms are not willing to reveal 
the extent to which they can and do disclose user data to the 
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government or the engineering and legal policies they have 
adopted that can effectively limit the government’s access to 
that data. Currently, there is little pressure to compete in this 
way. This section will propose several ways to fix this 
fundamentally broken market. 
II. RESTRICTING GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO DATA 
Technology firms in the United States are largely free to 
design their products and networks in any way they wish, at 
least with regard to the extent to which privacy enhancing 
technologies are included.19 Outside of the financial and 
common carrier telephone industries,20 there are no data 
retention laws. The few regulations that are applied focus on 
making sure that companies sufficiently protect their 
customers’ data from improper access by rogue insiders, 
hackers, and other criminals. 
Email, search engine, and broadband ISPs are free to 
deploy any privacy enhancing technology or policy that they 
wish to use, even if it may impact or thwart the ability of law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies to engage in legitimate 
investigations. Thus, a provider’s decision to adopt a particular 
privacy enhancing technology or to adopt a zero data log 
retention policy can significantly impact their customers’ 
privacy and freedom. That is, even though a company can be 
legally compelled to deliver any data in its possession, if the 
data is encrypted with a key not known to the company—or has 
not been retained in the first place—the firm will have nothing 
                                                          
 19. H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, pt. 1, at 13, 19 (1994) (quoting United States v. 
New York Tel., 434 U.S. 159, 177 (1977)) (“While the Supreme Court has read 
[18 U.S.C. 2518(4)] as requiring the Federal courts to compel, upon request of 
the government, ‘any assistance necessary to accomplish an electronic 
interception,’ the question of whether companies have any obligation to design 
their systems such that they do not impede law enforcement interception has 
never been adjudicated. . . . [The Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act] expressly provides that law enforcement may not dictate 
system design features and may not bar introduction of new features and 
technologies.”). 
 20. 47 C.F.R. § 42.6 (2009) (“Each carrier that offers or bills toll telephone 
service shall retain for a period of 18 months such records as are necessary to 
provide the following billing information about telephone toll calls: the name, 
address, and telephone number of the caller, telephone number called, date, 
time and length of the call. Each carrier shall retain this information for toll 
calls that it bills whether it is billing its own toll service customers for toll 
calls or billing customers for another carrier.”). 
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to deliver to the government. 
This section will explore several ways that companies’ 
engineering design decisions and data storage policies differ 
and will analyze the impact that such decisions have on 
customer privacy. In particular, although most firms do not 
publicly discuss or compete on the privacy provided by their 
products, the differences are significant enough that users of 
one service are often far better protected from government 
access to their data than users of other providers. 
A. LEAKING IP ADDRESSES IN E-MAIL HEADERS 
Several of the big free web mail providers intentionally 
leak their users’ IP addresses to anyone that their subscribers 
contact by email. This engineering decision, something not 
required by technical standards or law, may offer some benefit 
for service providers wishing to limit the use of their systems to 
send unsolicited “spam” email. However, the engineering 
decision also impacts end users’ privacy since users’ IP 
addresses are considered by many to be private information 
that can be linked to an individual and, potentially, their 
geographic location—a view shared by both the European 
Union Article 29 Working Party and the current FTC 
Chairman.21 
When a user of Microsoft’s Hotmail or Yahoo! Mail  
services sends an email message to another person, both 
companies insert the user’s actual IP address (that is, the IP 
address of the computer with which the user is accessing the 
Microsoft or Yahoo! website) into a header in the email 
message. While this header is typically not displayed to 
recipients by most email clients, technically savvy users (such 
as government investigators) can easily view the full header 
accompanying an email message to see the originating IP 
address. 
Microsoft’s Hotmail system appends the following header 
to all outgoing emails: 
X-Originating-IP: [68.48.136.114]22 
                                                          
 21. Interview by Bob Garfield with Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, FTC, on On 
the Media (Apr. 23, 2010), 
http://www.onthemedia.org/transcripts/2010/04/23/05 (“[T]here’s a question 
about whether if you can track something back to someone’s IP address it’s 
almost the same as personal information. I kind of think it is.”). 
 22. See Dan Boneh, Report to the Federal Trade Commission, The 
Difficulties of Tracing Spam (Sept. 9, 2004), 
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Yahoo’s mail system appends a similar header to all 
outgoing emails: 
Received: from [68.48.136.114] by web46311.mail.sp1.yahoo.com via 
HTTP 
When Google launched its own free email service, it opted 
to keep its customers’ IP address information private. The 
company’s website confirms this decision and reveals that 
privacy was one of the factors in not voluntarily appending the 
IP address to users’ outgoing emails: 
IP addresses can be considered sensitive information. As such, Gmail 
may hide sender IP address information from outgoing mail headers 
in some circumstances. 
Don’t worry—we aren’t enabling spammers to abuse the system by 
not revealing IP addresses. Gmail uses many innovative spam 
filtering mechanisms to ensure that spammers have a difficult time 
sending bulk emails that arrive in users inboxes.23 
Facebook appears to have not followed Google’s lead, and 
instead, adopted a policy similar to Microsoft and Yahoo, albeit 
in a way that is slightly obfuscated. 
Going at least as far back as 2006, when a Facebook user 
commented on another user’s profile, left a comment on his 
“wall,” or did any other action that triggered an email 
notification, the company would provide the IP address of the 
user initiating the action in the header of the email sent to the 
recipient of the notification: 
Received: from zuckmail ([68.48.136.114]) by hs.facebook.com with 
HTTP (ZuckMail).24 
At some point in 2009, Facebook modified this header 
slightly, so that the user’s IP address was obfuscated via 
Base64 encoding, which can be trivially reversed with off the 
shelf tools: 
                                                          
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/rewardsys/expertrpt_boneh.pdf. (“These services 
[Hotmail and Yahoo] embed an X-Originating-IP header in every email they 
send which completely identifies the sender’s network address.”) 
 23. Seeing a Sender’s IP Address, GOOGLE, 
https://mail.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=26903 (last 
updated Oct. 11, 2010). 
 24. See Ron Collings, Comment to Thread: 7.0.1 Beta GWIA Outbound 
Mail Scrambling HTML Content of Multiplemessages and Adding Multiple 
Disclaimers - Bug Report, NOVELL,  http://forums.novell.com/novell-product-
support-forums/groupwise/groupwise-7x/gw7-gwia/103615-7-0-1-beta-gwia-
outbound-mail-scrambling-html-content-multiplemessages-adding-multiple-
disclaimers-bug-report.html (Apr. 5, 2006, 6:28 AM)); Facebook Notifications 
Leaking Information, THE CLASSICALLY FORBIDDEN REGION (Dec. 5, 2007, 
2:46 AM), http://supersat.livejournal.com/71945.html. 
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X-Facebook: from zuckmail ([NjguNDguMTM2LjExNA==]) by 
www.facebook.com with HTTP (ZuckMail).25 
News of Facebook’s IP address header spread across 
several popular Internet blogs and forums in May 2010. In 
response, the company quickly changed the header format so 
that the user’s real IP address was no longer leaked.26 
The engineering decision to voluntarily provide a user’s IP 
address to the recipients of emails can have a major impact on 
an end user’s privacy and the ability of governments 
(particularly foreign governments) to investigate them, and can 
increase or reduce the workload for a service provider. 
For example, in the event that a Yahoo! or Hotmail account 
is used to send an email message that is later deemed to be 
relevant to an investigation by a U.S. law enforcement agency, 
the investigators will not need to send Yahoo! or Microsoft a 
subpoena for the IP address connection logs, but will simply 
look through the email header and then go directly to the 
broadband ISP responsible for that IP address. That is, by 
providing this IP address information in the header of every 
outgoing email, Yahoo!, Microsoft (and until recently, 
Facebook) significantly reduced the need for law enforcement to 
contact them to get user data. 
Had Yahoo! or Microsoft not proactively disclosed the IP 
address information in the header, law enforcement 
investigators would have had to obtain a subpoena, serve it on 
the companies, and then wait days or weeks for the companies 
to provide the data. In addition to the delay, this extra step 
would have given the email service providers the opportunity to 
give their customer notice that his or her records were 
subpoenaed or to force the police to seek a court order if they 
sought to delay such notice.27 
By forcing law enforcement agencies to contact the 
webmail provider in order to determine a suspect’s IP address, 
the webmail provider can also act as a choke point, carefully 
evaluating each request for information and rejecting those 
that do not meet the appropriate standard or that come from a 
                                                          
 25. Chester Wisniewski, Facebook Notifications Leak IP Addresses, 
DIGITALTHREAT.NET (May 8, 2010), 
http://www.digitalthreat.net/2010/05/facebook-notifications-leak-ip-addresses. 
 26. See Matt C., Facebook Leaks IP Addresses, BINARY INTELLIGENCE 
(May 7, 2010), http://www.binint.com/2010/05/facebook-leaks-ip-
addresses.html. 
 27. 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (2006). 
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foreign government that the provider has no legal obligation to 
assist. For example, in the event that a request comes from 
investigators in a foreign country, a service provider can often 
ignore the request and, thus, effectively protect the privacy of 
their customers. In such situations, this minor speed bump 
becomes a highly effective privacy tool. 
Consider a scenario in which a pro-democracy activist in 
Vietnam, Zimbabwe, or some other oppressive regime is using 
their U.S.-based webmail provider to send out documents. 
Should state security officials obtain one of the email messages 
sent by the activist, the choice of webmail provider will 
significantly impact their ability to determine her identity. If 
the activist uses Google’s Gmail service, the only way for the 
authorities to learn her IP address will be to contact Google 
and ask for the information—something the company is highly 
unlikely to provide. If, on the other hand, the activist uses 
Microsoft Hotmail or Yahoo! Mail, the state security officials 
will be able to locate her IP address in the header of the 
received email and to go directly to her domestic ISP in order to 
identify the activist. Even if Yahoo! or Microsoft have an official 
policy of not cooperating with the authorities in Zimbabwe or 
Myanmar, it will do the user no good. 
By automatically including the user’s IP address in the 
headers of outbound email messages, Microsoft, Yahoo, and, 
until recently, Facebook have robbed themselves of the ability 
to protect their users from unreasonable or illegal law 
enforcement investigations. 
B. COMMUNITY OF INTEREST DATABASES 
In the late 1990s, researchers at AT&T created the 
Hancock programming language to enable efficient data mining 
of the company’s telephone and internet access records. The 
system was originally created to develop marketing leads and 
as a security tool to see if new customers called the same 
numbers as previously cut-off fraudsters—something the 
original researchers referred to as “guilt by association.”28 
However, the government soon took an interest in the ability to 
                                                          
 28. See Corinna Cortes et al., Communities of Interest, 2189 PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE 4TH INT’L CONF. ON ADVANCES IN INTELLIGENT DATA ANALYSIS 105, 
110–11 (2001) (describing the tendency of ‘fraudsters’ to have closer links to 
other ‘fraudsters’ than a random account would have). 
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sift through the telecom giant’s vast databases. 
In 2007, it was revealed that Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) had been seeking “community of interest” 
or “calling circle” records from several telecommunications 
providers via National Security Letters, grand jury subpoenas, 
exigent letters, and email requests. 29 These records might 
include an analysis of which people the targets called most 
frequently, how long they generally talked and at what times of 
day, sudden fluctuations in activity, geographic regions that 
were called, and other data.30 
A subsequent investigation by the Inspector General of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) found that these powers had been 
widely abused by the FBI. 31 According to the Inspector General 
report, “[AT&T] records show that from 2004 to 2007, [AT&T] 
analysts [embedded within the FBI’s Telecommunications Data 
Collection Center] used [AT&T’s] community of interest 
[redacted] to review records in its database for 10,070 
[redacted] telephone numbers.”32 
AT&T was not the only telecommunications carrier to have 
embedded employees within the FBI unit that abused its 
powers—Verizon, too, had employees on site. As such, Verizon 
received subpoenas and NSLs containing requests to “identify a 
‘calling circle’ for the foregoing telephone numbers based on a 
two-generation community of interest [and] provide subscriber 
information.”33 However, because the company did not 
maintain a community of interest database, it was able to 
simply ignore that component of the requests it received.34 
                                                          
 29. See Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Data Mining Reached Beyond Initial 
Targets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/09/washington/09fbi.html#. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU 
OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF EXIGENT LETTERS AND OTHER INFORMAL 
REQUESTS FOR TELEPHONE RECORDS (2010). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Milch, supra note 1, at 13 (“Verizon has also received subpoenas and 
NSLs containing ‘boilerplate’ language directing us, for example, to ‘Identify a 
‘calling circle’ for the foregoing telephone numbers based on a two-generation 
community of interest; provide subscriber information.’ Because Verizon does 
not maintain such ‘calling circle’ records, we have not provided this 
information in response to these requests; we have not analyzed the legal 
justification for any such requests, been offered indemnification for any such 
requests, or sought our customers’ consent to respond to such any such 
requests.”). 
 34. Id. 
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The original researchers who created AT&T’s community 
of interest system likely did not plan for their tool to be used to 
further government surveillance. However, once AT&T had the 
system in place, the government could compel its use. Verizon 
effectively protected its customers’ privacy against fishing 
expeditions and other large-scale requests for information by 
not deploying a similar system. 
C. PROACTIVE SEARCHES FOR CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
Federal law requires that ISPs immediately notify the 
appropriate authorities when they detect or otherwise learn 
about the presence of child pornography on their servers.35 In 
order to comply with the law, most large Internet companies, 
particularly those that host user generated images and videos, 
review content that has been flagged by their users or other 
third parties.36 
The law does not, however, require that ISPs seek out such 
materials by automatically analyzing their customers’ 
communications. Nevertheless, several ISPs have opted to do 
so. 
In 2002, AOL developed and began using a proprietary 
Image Detection and Filtering Program (IDFP), which 
calculates a cryptographic hash (or fingerprint) of each file 
attached to email messages sent or received by its subscribers 
and then compares these hashes to a database of hashes for 
images that AOL has previously identified as images depicting 
child pornography. In the event that AOL’s IDFP system 
detects the attachment of known child pornography, the 
company notifies the National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children (NCMEC) as required by law.37 
According to court filings by the company, “AOL developed 
and began using the IDFP in 2002 in order to protect its rights 
and property against lawbreakers, prevent the network from 
being used to carry or store contraband (i.e., illegal child 
pornography), and fulfill its legal obligation to report the 
                                                          
 35. 18 U.S.C. § 2258A (2006). 
 36. See, e.g., Brad Stone, Policing the Web’s Lurid Precincts: An Emotional 
Toll on Guardians Against Depravity, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2010, at B1 
(describing the efforts of large tech companies such as Microsoft, Yahoo!, 
MySpace, and YouTube to review content flagged as inappropriate). 
 37. United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 363 (4th Cir. 2010). 
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transmission . . . of child pornography on its systems.”38 
Child pornography is an issue that plagues the debate over 
online privacy. No one wants to be seen as fighting for the 
rights of child pornographers, and, as such, it is extremely 
difficult to engage in a reasonable public discussion about the 
extent to which the privacy of normal users can and should be 
sacrificed in order to assist in the government’s attempts to 
detect and prosecute such crimes. While many ISPs and legal 
experts have reservations about the tactics used by government 
investigators, prosecutors, and the quasi-governmental 
NCMEC, few will go on record to air such complaints.39 
AOL’s decision to proactively scan its customers’ email 
attachments for child pornography has a major impact on their 
privacy, and, more importantly, the impact of this system 
extends far beyond the company’s desire to assist in the 
discovery of such illegal content. The reason for this is that 
once a technical infrastructure has been designed and 
deployed, service providers are not in a position to limit the 
extent to which they can be compelled to use it.40 Thus, AOL’s 
automatic email attachment analysis system could also be used 
to determine if its customers are transmitting bomb making 
instructions, copyrighted images, songs and books, seditious 
newsletters, or religious texts. The government can simply 
provide the company with a list of additional hashes to add to 
the company’s database and then wait for AOL to detect the 
transmission of such files.41 
AOL’s intentions may have been pure when the company 
dedicated engineering time to developing its email attachment 
scanning system, and it is quite possible that the vast majority 
of its customers might even approve of such a service and the 
associated intrusion into their communications privacy if they 
                                                          
 38. Id. 
 39. Christopher Soghoian, Editorial: It’s Time for a Child Porn Czar, 
SURVEILLANCE STATE (Dec. 9, 2008, 7:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
13739_3-10118923-46.html (recounting the reluctance of experts in the field of 
Internet law and policy to go on record to voice their criticism of the NCMEC). 
 40. See Miles Benson, In the Name of Homeland Security, Telecom Firms 
are Deluged with Subpoenas, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Dec. 30, 2005), 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=1677 (quoting 
telecom lawyer Al Gidari describing this phenomenon as, “if you build it, they 
will come”). 
 41. There is no evidence to suggest that AOL has ever searched for 
anything but child pornography using the database of hashes it has created 
itself. 
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knew it is occurring. However, the service may eventually be 
used for far more dubious law enforcement purposes, some of 
which AOL’s customers are unlikely to consider reasonable. 
While AOL was the first ISP to embrace this practice, it is 
not the only company to do so. In June 2010, several large 
social networks, including Facebook and MySpace, announced 
that they would begin scanning their customers’ uploaded 
images against a database of child pornography hash 
signatures provided by the New York Attorney General.42 
D. ENCRYPTION 
Encryption technologies have been readily available to 
consumers for more than a decade, are now included in all 
modern operating systems and web browsers, and, as such, are 
widely used by many companies. Many companies use 
encryption technologies to protect the transmission of sensitive 
data (such as credit card numbers) between a customer’s 
computer and a company’s server. However, some firms are 
increasingly also encrypting users’ data in storage so that no 
one other than the end user (including the service provider) can 
access the data. 
Telecommunication carriers and technology firms in the 
United States are legally free to add encryption capabilities to 
their products.43 However, a firm’s legal obligations to provide 
the government with access to users’ data differ based on the 
provider’s ability to access the encryption key used to encrypt 
the data. If a company does not have access to the encryption 
key or to other “information necessary to decrypt the 
                                                          
 42. Attorney General Cuomo Announces Additional Social Networking 
Sites Join His Initiative To Eliminate Sharing Of Thousands Of Images Of 
Child Pornography, OFF. N.Y. ATT’Y GEN. (June 29, 2010), 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2010/june/june29a_10.html. 
 43. H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, pt. 1, at 25 (1994) (“Finally, 
telecommunications carriers have no responsibility to decrypt encrypted 
communications that are the subject of court-ordered wiretaps, unless the 
carrier provided the encryption and can decrypt it. This obligation is 
consistent with the obligation to furnish all necessary assistance under 18 
U.S.C. Section 2518(4). Nothing in this paragraph would prohibit a carrier 
from deploying an encryption service for which it does not retain the ability to 
decrypt communications for law enforcement access. . . . Nothing in the bill is 
intended to limit or otherwise prevent the use of any type of encryption within 
the United States. Nor does the Committee intend this bill to be in any way a 
precursor to any kind of ban or limitation on encryption technology. To the 
contrary, section 2602 protects the right to use encryption.”). 
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communication,” it has no legal obligation to decrypt its users’ 
data or to otherwise ensure the government’s ability to decrypt 
any subscriber encrypted communication.44 However, if the 
company does have a copy of (or access to) the decryption key, it 
can be compelled to decrypt the user’s data.45 
1. Transport Encryption 
The use of encryption to protect users’ private information 
in transit brings multiple privacy benefits: it limits the ability 
of cyber-criminals and other nefarious persons to intercept data 
and even hijack users’ accounts, it prevents the analysis of 
users’ communications by ISPs using Deep Packet Inspection 
hardware in order to deliver behaviorally targeted advertising, 
and it effectively thwarts network-based surveillance by 
government agencies, forcing them to go directly to the 
company storing the data, rather than being able to passively 
intercept it in transit with the assistance of an ISP.46 
While the banking and finance industries long ago adopted 
SSL transport encryption (enabling users to securely e-bank at 
home), the vast majority of cloud computing services are today, 
by default, insecure. This is because most consumer-aimed 
cloud services do not use common encryption technologies to 
protect user data in transit.47 However, a few cloud computing 
firms, such as Google, have opted to encrypt user data in 
                                                          
 44. Id. at 39. 
 45. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(3) (2006) (“A telecommunications carrier 
shall not be responsible for decrypting, or ensuring the government’s ability to 
decrypt, any communication encrypted by a subscriber or customer, unless the 
encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier possesses the 
information necessary to decrypt the communication.”). 
 46. See generally Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP 
Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417 (describing the necessary balance 
between user privacy and ISP need). 
 47. See Predrag Klasnja et al., “When I am on Wi-Fi, I am Fearless:” 
Privacy Concerns & Practices in Everyday Wi-Fi Use, 2009 PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE 27TH INT’L CONF. ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 1993, available 
at http://www.seattle.intel-research.net/pubs/p1993-klasnja.pdf (“A majority of 
the large Web-based email services, for example, encrypt the login process, but 
not the contents of email messages. Anyone along the path between the user 
and the service’s data center could intercept this information, opening users to 
privacy and security risks.”); Letter from Jacob Appelbaum et al. to Eric 
Schmidt, CEO, Google, Inc. (June 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.cloudprivacy.net/letter (“Google is not the only Web 2.0 firm which 
leaves its customers vulnerable to data theft and account hijacking. Users of 
Microsoft Hotmail, Yahoo Mail, Facebook and MySpace are also vulnerable to 
these attacks.”). 
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transit, in some cases by default. 
When Google launched its Gmail email service in 2004, it 
offered SSL transport encryption as an option, albeit one not 
enabled by default. Likewise, when the company later rolled 
out its Docs, Spreadsheets, and Calendar apps, they, too, could 
be accessed via SSL but, again, not by default. However, in 
June 2009, thirty-eight industry and academic experts from the 
fields of computer security, privacy, and law (led by this 
author) wrote an open letter to Google’s CEO to chastise the 
company for its lack of default transport encryption.48 Seven 
months later, the company enabled HTTPS encryption by 
default for its Gmail service, and, approximately six months 
after that, also enabled encryption for its Docs, Spreadsheets, 
and Calendar services, too.49 Similarly, in May 2010, the 
company began to offer SSL encrypted search, making it the 
first major search engine to do so.50 
Following Google’s lead, or perhaps feeling increased 
pressure from consumer protection regulators,51 Microsoft, in 
November 2010, started to offer SSL protection for its popular 
Hotmail service, although not enabled by default.52 
                                                          
 48. See Appelbaum, supra note 48; see also Ryan Singel, Encrypt the 
Cloud, Security Luminaries Tell Google – Update, WIRED (June 16, 2009), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/06/google_ssl (reporting on the letter 
from security researchers to Google and the company’s response). 
 49. See Sam Schillace, Default HTTPS Access for Gmail, THE OFFICIAL 
GMAIL BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010, 9:14 PM), 
http://gmailblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/default-https-access-for-gmail.html 
(describing the process behind the decision to enable HTTPS encryption by 
default). 
 50. See Evan Roseman, Search More Securely with Encrypted Google Web 
Search, THE OFFICIAL GMAIL BLOG (June 25, 2010, 12:30 PM), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/search-more-securely-with-
encrypted.html (announcing the option for encrypted searches on Google). 
 51. Pamela Jones Harbour, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks Before 
Third Fed. Trade Comm’n Exploring Privacy Roundtable in Washington, D.C. 
(March 17, 2010) available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/harbour/100317privacyroundtable.pdf (“My 
bottom line is simple: security needs to be a default in the cloud. Today, I 
challenge all of the companies that are not yet using SSL by default. That 
includes all email providers, social networking sites, and any website that 
transmits consumer data. Step up and protect consumers. Don’t do it just 
some of the time. Make your websites secure by default.”). 
 52. See Dick Craddock, Hotmail Security Improves with Full-Session 
HTTPS Encryption, INSIDE WINDOWS LIVE BLOG (Nov. 09, 2010), 
http://windowsteamblog.com/windows_live/b/windowslive/archive/2010/11/09/h
otmail-security-improves-with-full-session-https-encryption.aspx. 
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The thirty-eight experts who pushed Google to enable SSL 
by default, and the FTC Commissioner who later pushed for 
other companies to do the same, all called for the use of 
encryption to address a single threat: hackers and other 
criminals who can otherwise easily snoop on consumers as they 
connect to cloud based services from public wireless Internet 
networks. Not mentioned was the equally real threat of 
surveillance by governments around the world, made possible 
with the assistance of major telecommunication carriers who 
have given intelligence agencies access to their backbone 
networks.53 
Whatever the motivation for the switch to SSL, Google’s 
decision had a very real impact on the ability of many foreign 
governments to spy on their citizens’ communications (at least 
in those countries in which Google does not respond to 
subpoenas or other formal requests). For example, just one 
month after Google enabled SSL by default for Gmail, the 
Iranian government blocked all domestic access to Google’s 
email service.54 According to media reports, communications 
experts believe that the Iranian authorities’ decision to block 
Gmail was in response Google’s adoption of encryption by 
default.55 Yahoo! and Hotmail, neither of which offers 
encryption by default, were not blocked by the Iranians. 
2. Storage Encryption 
Cloud-based services do not, by their very nature, have to 
store their users’ data in the clear and, consequently, put the 
privacy of their users at risk. Consider as an example the 
Firefox Sync feature in the Firefox web browser.56 This feature 
enables users to keep their bookmarks, browsing history, saved 
passwords, and cookie synchronized across multiple computers. 
The feature includes support for the Firefox mobile browser, 
allowing users to bookmark a web page at home and then view 
                                                          
 53. See generally Siobhan Gorman, NSA’s Domestic Spying Grows As 
Agency Sweeps Up Data: Terror Fight Blurs Line Over Domain; Tracking 
Email, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2008, at A1 (reporting on the large amount of 
electronic records spy agencies now monitor). 
 54. See Nazila Fathi, Iran Disrupts Internet Communications, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 11, 2010, at A6. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Sync, MOZILLA, https://www.mozilla.com/en-US/firefox/sync/ (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2010). 
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it later in the day from their phone or other portable device.57 
Like all cloud services, The Mozilla Corporation (which 
makes Firefox) is able to provide this instant, worldwide access 
by allowing users to store their own data on the company’s 
servers. However, Mozilla baked privacy into the product at the 
design stages, stating that a key principle of the project is that 
“users own their data, and have complete control over its use. 
Users need to explicitly enable third parties to access their 
data.”58 As a result, the data that Sync users store on Mozilla’s 
servers is encrypted with a key created by that user and which 
is not shared with anyone else. Mozilla provides the cloud-
based storage, but is unable to peek at its users’ stored 
passwords and browsing history.59 In the event that law 
enforcement or intelligence agencies seek to compel Mozilla to 
share its users’ data, the company can confidently hand over 
the encrypted files with the knowledge that the data is 
complete gibberish to everyone but its owner. 
Mozilla is not the only organization to use encryption to 
securely store users’ data in the cloud. Over the past several 
years, numerous companies have started to offer cloud-based 
backup solutions that enable users to automatically store their 
personal documents and other important files online.60 
However, of all these services, SpiderOak has opted to build 
strong encryption into their product by default.61 The company 
describes itself as a “‘zero knowledge backup provider,” 
arguing, “[W]e do not know anything about the data that you 
store on SpiderOak not even your folder or filenames. On the 
server we only see sequentially numbered containers of 
encrypted data.” Other than its strong encryption feature, the 
service is remarkably similar to the numerous other products 
in the online backup market.62 
                                                          
 57. Id. 
 58. Services/Sync/FxSync/Archived/OAuth, MOZILLA WIKI, 
 https://wiki.mozilla.org/Labs/Weave/OAuth (last modified July 12, 2010). 
 59. Id. 
 60. These include Dropbox, Box.net, Sugarsync, Elephantdrive, and 
Microsoft Live Mesh. 
 61. Free Windows, Mac and Linux Online Backup, Online Sync, Share & 
Storage from SpiderOak.com, SPIDEROAK.COM, https://www.spideroak.com 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2010). 
 62. Engineering Matters, SPIDEROAK.COM, 
https://spideroak.com/engineering_matters#true_privacy (last visited Sept. 30, 
2010); Frequently Asked Questions, SPIDEROAK.COM, 
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Currently, the major Internet giants such as Google, 
Microsoft, and Facebook have yet to add any form of secure 
storage encryption to their products. One reason for this may 
be that these products are largely supported by targeted 
advertising, which often relies upon the ability to look through 
the plain text of users’ communications and other private data. 
Unfortunately for these firms, it is exceedingly difficult to 
monetize a data set that one cannot look at.63 If these firms do 
eventually decide to offer encrypted cloud based storage, it is 
likely first to be to the enterprise customers who are charged a 
fee to use the firms’ services. 
E. DATA RETENTION POLICIES 
The decision to delete data is often one of the most effective 
ways in which a company can preserve the privacy of its 
customers. There are both direct and indirect costs for keeping 
data. The costs of the storage technology (e.g., hard disks, 
backup tapes) shrink every year, making it increasingly cheap 
to retain data. However, the increasing costs of personal 
information handling rules, data breaches, and lawsuits do 
appear to be providing some companies with an economic 
incentive to delete data once they no longer need it.64 
As such, most technology providers and communications 
                                                          
https://spideroak.com/faq/does_spideroak_use_encryption_when_storing_and_t
ransferring_data (last visited Sept. 30, 2010). 
 63. Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and 
Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 
359, 397 (2010) (“It is exceedingly difficult to monetize a data set that you 
cannot look at. Google’s popular Gmail service scans the text of individual 
emails, and algorithmically displays relevant advertisements next to the 
email. When a user receives an email from a friend relating to vacation plans, 
Google can display an advertisement for hotels near to the destination, rental 
cars or travel insurance. If those emails are encrypted with a key not known to 
Google, the company is unable to scan the contents and display related 
advertising. Sure, the company can display generic advertisements unrelated 
to the user’s communications contents, but these will be far less profitable.”). 
 64. See Ellen Messmer, Data Breach Costs Top $200 per Customer Record, 
NETWORKWORLD (Jan. 25, 2010), 
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2010/012510-data-breach-costs.html (“The 
cost of a data breach increased last year to $204 per compromised customer 
record, according to the Ponemon Institute’s annual study. The average total 
cost of a data breach rose from $6.65 million in 2008 to $6.75 million in 
2009.”); Holly Towle & Scott L. David, Is Data Like Toxic Waste?, K&L GATES, 
http://www.engr.washington.edu/epp/infosec/presentations/Sep%2016%20data
%20as%20toxic%20asset%20presentation%20as%20sent%20V2.ppt (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2010) (“Data protection laws have turned Personal 
Information (“PI”) into the intangible equivalent of toxic waste.”). 
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carriers now have established data retention policies that 
govern the length of time before which they will delete 
customer records, communications, logs, and other data. 
Unfortunately, outside of the search engine market, where 
pressure from European regulators has lead to companies 
publicly touting their policies, few other firms will publicly 
reveal their own data retention rules.65 
The widespread lack of public information about data 
retention policies poses a significant problem for consumers 
wishing to evaluate potential service providers on their 
respective privacy merits. Furthermore, differences among 
providers operating in the same market do vary considerably, 
which means that the decision to pick a particular service 
provider can have a significant impact on a user’s privacy. 
A great example of this is seen in the wireless telephone 
market. Sprint Nextel assigns each Internet-connected wireless 
handset a static IP address and logs the allocation of these 
addresses for a twenty-four month period.66 The company also 
logs the URL of each webpage viewed by its customers, whose 
handsets route requests through the company’s WAP Media 
Access Gateway proxy server.67 In contrast, both T-Mobile and 
                                                          
 65. Compare Peter Fleischer, Jane Horvath & Alma Whitten, Another 
Step to Protect User Privacy, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG, (Sept. 8, 2008, 7:06 PM), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/09/another-step-to-protect-user-
privacy.html (explaining how Google’s data retention policy is affected by EU, 
and other, regulators), with Sprint Nextel International Data Privacy Policy, 
SPRINT, 
http://shop.sprint.com/en/solutions/sprint_worldwide/international_data_priva
cy_popup.shtml (last visited Nov. 13, 2010) (“Sprint Nextel retains all of the 
information it collects under this Privacy Policy in compliance with applicable 
law and as long as there is a business need for it. In addition, we have a record 
retention policy that generally implements the broad range of regulatory 
requirements imposed on service providers for recordkeeping.”). 
 66. Paul Taylor, Elec. Surveillance Manager, Sprint Nextel, Address at 
the ISS World Conference, Washington DC, (Oct. 13, 2009) (audio available at 
http://www.eff.org/files/soghoian-surveillance-dump.zip) (“Nextel’s system, 
they statically assign IP addresses to all handsets . . . . We do have logs, we 
can go back to see the IP address . . . . On the Sprint 3G network, we have IP 
data records back 24 months, and we have, depending on the device, we can 
actually tell you what URL they went to . . . . If [the handset uses] the [WAP] 
Media Access Gateway, we have the URL history for 24 months . . . . We don’t 
store it because law enforcement asks us to store it, we store it because when 
we launched 3G in 2001 or so, we thought we were going to bill by the 
megabyte . . . but ultimately, that’s why we store the data . . . . It’s because 
marketing wants to rifle through the data.”). 
 67. Id. 
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Cricket Communications use a Network Address Translation 
(NAT) based infrastructure in which all customers from a 
region appear to use one of a handful of IP addresses.68 
Consequently, the companies are unable to reveal after-the-fact 
which particular customer was responsible for traffic 
originating from their network.69 
As a result of these policies, a Sprint Nextel customer can 
later be tracked down based on an anonymous comment left on 
a blog or a peer-to-peer (P2P) file downloaded over the 
company’s cellular network, while customers of T-Mobile and 
Cricket can freely engage in a variety of online activities 
without any risk of later discovery. 
While most companies are not willing to disclose their data 
retention periods to their customers or to queries from 
members of the privacy community, they seem quite willing to 
voluntarily provide this information to the law enforcement 
community. Most Internet and telecommunications providers 
have created law enforcement handbooks, which, in addition to 
providing “boilerplate” sample subpoenas and search warrant 
applications, also detail the kinds of data that each firm retains 
and for how long. Over the last year, many of these law 
enforcement handbooks have surfaced on the Internet, much to 
the displeasure of their creators. 
These law enforcement handbooks enable, for the first 
time, some degree of transparency in this area. I have created 
Table 1 based on the handbooks that have been leaked thus far. 
Clearly, many companies are missing from the table—but 
                                                          
 68. Janet A. Schwabe, Subpoena Compliance Manager, Cricket 
Communications, Address at the ISS World Conference, Washington D.C. 
(Oct. 13, 2009) (audio available at http://www.eff.org/files/soghoian-
surveillance-dump.zip at approximately 105:00). 
 69. See, e.g., Gavin Pinchback, Director, Law Enforcement Relations, T-
Mobile USA, Address at the ISS World Conference, Washington D.C. (Oct. 13, 
2009) (audio available at http://www.eff.org/files/soghoian-surveillance-
dump.zip at approximately  108.09) (“[T-mobile is] in the same boat that 
Cricket is, in terms of determining the IP address—determining the 
subscriber attached to that IP address.”); Schwabe, supra note 68 (“One of the 
challenges for Cricket, and a challenge for the law enforcement community, is 
that we now have broadband and internet access from the handset. And in 
both instances, the signal goes to our switch, and then is relayed to Level 3 
Communications, which then is the conduit to the Internet. From the outside, 
from the point of capture of the IP address, it is the generic or regional IP 
address that is picked up. There is no way to come back through our firewall 
to see which subscriber had a per-session identification on that, and that is 
something that even if you go to Level 3, they’re not going to have any 
information either.”). 
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compared to what was known one year ago, this is a great step 
in the right direction (even if it was not accomplished with the 
assistance or consent of the firms whose policies have been 
revealed). 
 
Table 1. Data Retention Policies 
Company IP Address Login 
Data Retained 
Account Registration 
Information Retained 
Microsoft 60 days70 Life of account. 
Yahoo 6 months71 Life of account + 90 
days after deletion. 
AOL 90 days72 Unknown 
MySpace 1 year73 Life of account + 90 
days after deletion. 
Facebook Generally 90 days74 Unknown 
Time Warner Cable 6 months75 Unknown 
                                                          
 70. Global Criminal Compliance Handbook 6, Microsoft Online Services 
(Mar. 2008), available at http://cryptome.org//isp-spy/microsoft-spy.zip 
[hereinafter Microsoft]. 
 71. Compliance Guide for Law Enforcement 4–5, Yahoo!, available at 
http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/yahoo-spy.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2010) 
[hereinafter Yahoo!]. The company has since reduced its data retention period 
for most logs to six months. Press Release, Yahoo!, Inc., Yahoo! Sets New 
Industry Privacy Standard with Data Retention Policy (Dec. 17, 2008), 
http://yhoo.client.shareholder.com/press/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=354703. 
 72. Public Safety & Criminal Investigations 18, AOL (Sep. 2008), 
available at http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/aol-spy.pdf. 
 73. Law Enforcement Investigators Guide 7, MySpace, available at 
http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/myspace-spy.pdf (November 1, 2007) (on file with 
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology) [hereinafter MySpace 2007]. 
For a previous version stating MySpace retains IP data for 90 days, see Law 
Enforcement Investigators Guide 7–8, MySpace, available at 
http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/myspace-spy.pdf (last updated June 23, 2006) 
[hereinafter MySpace 2006]. 
 74. Subpoena/Search Warrant Guidelines 5, Facebook (Feb. 2008), 
available at http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/facebook-spy.pdf [hereinafter 
Facebook]. See Confidential Facebook Law Enforcement Subpoena Guides 
2007–2010, PUB. INTELLIGENCE (OCT. 6,2010), 
http://publicintelligence.net/confidential-facebook-law-enforcement-subpoena-
guides-2007-2010 for copies of Facebook’s Law Enforcement Subpoena Guides 
for the years 2007–2010. 
 75. Nate Anderson, Time Warner Cable Tries to Put Brakes on Massive 
Piracy Case, ARS TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2010/05/time-warner-cable-tries-to-put-brakes-on-massive-piracy-
case.ars (“TWC has a six-month retention period for its IP lookup logs, and by 
the time TWC could turn to law enforcement requests, many of these requests 
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1. Data Retention Creep 
One significant problem stemming from the widespread 
industry practice of firms not disclosing their data retention 
policies is that consumers are completely unaware of changes 
to those policies. Worse is that, other than in the case of the 
search engines (who are under intense regulatory pressure to 
keep less and less data), data retention policy changes usually 
occur in only one direction: towards greater retention. 
For example, over the last year or two, multiple wireless 
carriers have extended the retention period for historical cell 
site location information. Retention periods of six months to 
one year for cell site data are now common across the industry, 
a significant increase over the thirty days or fewer that the 
data was retained two years ago.76 Similarly, between 2007 and 
2008, MySpace and Facebook both increased their data 
retention periods for user login IP session data. In 2006, 
MySpace logged IP addresses associated with account logins for 
ninety days. In 2007, the company expanded its logging of this 
data to one year.77 Facebook logged IP addresses for thirty days 
in 2007, but, by 2008, the company had opted to keep the logs 
for ninety days.78 
These social networking sites did not publicly announce 
changes in their policies, nor did they update their privacy 
policies to reflect these rather significant shifts (likely because 
the privacy policies did not list the original data retention 
period, let alone the new one). Instead, the only mentions of the 
changes were made in updated handbooks provided to law 
enforcement agencies. 
In most cases, the move to increase data retention seems to 
have been a voluntary decision on the part of the carriers. In 
other instances, law enforcement agencies have requested and 
even paid for increased data retention. For example, three 
telecommunications carriers have been paid $1.8 million per 
year to provide the FBI with “near real-time access to [two 
years of stored] United States communications records 
(including telephone and Internet records).”79 Needless to say, 
                                                          
could not be answered.”) (last updated May 2010). 
 76. Declan McCullagh, Feds Push for Tracking Cell Phones, CNET NEWS 
(Feb. 11, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10451518-38.html. 
 77. Compare MySpace 2007, supra note 73, at 7, with MySpace 2006, 
supra note 73, at 7–8. 
 78. Facebook, supra note 74, at 5. 
 79. Communication Exploitation, WIRED, 
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neither Verizon nor AT&T, two of the firms that received 
millions of dollars to provide the FBI access to their customers’ 
data, opted to inform their customers that the firms were 
entering into these relationships to monetize their data and 
increase the ease with which it could be disclosed to FBI 
agents. 
2. The Impact of Zero Data Retention Policies—Or Unintended 
Consequences of the Copyright Lobby 
Although none of the major U.S.-based Internet application 
providers and telecommunications carriers have adopted zero 
data retention policies, several large companies in other 
counties have done just that, as have smaller firms in the 
United States. These policies have had a direct impact on the 
ability of law enforcement authorities to compel the disclosure 
of data. Simply put, when no data is retained, there is nothing 
to deliver when a subpoena later arrives. 
In April 2009, Sweden enacted a controversial law that 
grants copyright holders the authority to request the personal 
details of alleged infringers from ISPs. The response from 
consumers was swift—Swedish Internet traffic dropped by over 
thirty percent starting the day that the new law came into 
effect.80 This clear demonstration of consumers’ privacy fears 
then led to rapid competition in the market for privacy-
preserving services. 
Within weeks, three of Sweden’s ISPs announced new zero 
data retention policies for the IP addresses provided to 
broadband customers. Explaining the motivation for change in 
policy, the CEO of one of the country’s largest ISPs said, “[I]t’s 
a strong wish from our customers, so we decided not to store 
information on customers’ IP numbers.”81 
The adoption of these zero data retention policies has 
                                                          
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/files/communicationsexploitati
onoffice08budget.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2010). 
 80. Piracy Law Cuts Internet Traffic, BBC NEWS (Apr. 2, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7978853.stm (“The new law, which is 
based on the European Union’s Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement 
Directive (IPRED), allows copyright holders to obtain a court order forcing 
ISPs to provide the IP addresses identifying which computers have been 
sharing copyrighted material. . . . [T]raffic fell from an average of 120Gbps to 
80Gbps on the day the new law came into effect.”). 
 81. Mats Lewan, Swedish ISPs Vow to Erase users’ Traffic Data, CNET 
NEWS (Apr. 28, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10229618-93.html. 
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generated unintended consequences beyond the area of 
copyright enforcement. In May 2010, the head of the Swedish 
Police’s National IT crime unit told one newspaper that, due to 
a lack of customer logging data at ISPs, it has become much 
harder for the police to trace and identify criminal suspects.82 
Outside of Sweden, the threat of copyright lawsuits has 
also almost singlehandedly created a growth industry in 
commercial anonymous Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
providers that openly advertise zero log retention polices and 
through which users of peer-to-peer software can download 
content without fear of being identified.83 Of course, these 
services’ zero log retention policies thwart investigations by law 
enforcement agencies, in addition to just Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA) lawyers. 
III. STRICT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE LAW CAN ALSO 
RESTRICT GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO DATA 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)84 
details the instances in which telecommunications carriers and 
ISPs can and cannot disclose their customers’ communications. 
With regard to government access, the law is quite specific in 
some areas, and, as such, when a company receives a valid 
subpoena, 2703(d) order, or search warrant, there is not much 
that the company can do other than disclose the data required 
of it. However, there are quite a few grey areas where several 
companies have adopted strict, pro-privacy interpretations of 
the law. This section outlines these grey areas, several of which 
have never before been publicly discussed. 
                                                          
 82. See Enigmax, Police Say Anti-Piracy Law Makes Catching Criminals 
Harder, TORRENTFREAK (May 17, 2010), http://torrentfreak.com/police-say-
anti-piracy-law-makes-catching-criminals-harder-100517. 
 83. See, e.g., FAQ & Support, YOURPRIVATEVPN, 
http://www.yourprivatevpn.com/?q=en/faq_en (last visited Oct. 14, 2010) (“The 
servers are configured in such a way that they do not store IP addresses. . . . 
Our goal is to make our customers feel safe again. Therefore data, which we 
might be forced to hand over to authorities, is not being stored.”); Frequently 
Asked Questions, PERFECT PRIVACY, http://www.perfect-privacy.com/faq.html 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2010) (“For the privacy and anonymity of our members we 
have disabled logging.”); Torrent Freedom, TORRENT FREEDOM, 
http://torrentfreedom.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2010) (“We’ll make your traffic 
completely transparent. Anonymity is our business.”); Welcome to FlashVPN, 
FLASHVPN.COM, http://www.flashvpn.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2010) (“No 
provider logs”). 
 84. Pub. L. No. 99-508 § 1 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 
U.S.C.). 
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A. OPENED EMAILS AND THEOFEL 
18 USC 2703(a) states that “a governmental entity may 
require the disclosure by a provider of electronic 
communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic 
communications system for one hundred and eighty days or 
less, only pursuant to a warrant.”85 
There has been considerable debate about the definition of 
the term “electronic storage,” as the DOJ has taken the position 
that once an email message has been opened, it is no longer in 
electronic storage and, thus, can be divulged pursuant to a 
subpoena or 2703(d) order.86 
The government’s narrow interpretation of “electronic 
storage” was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Theofel v. Farey-
Jones,87 in which the court held that email messages continue 
to be in “electronic storage” regardless of whether they have 
been previously accessed.88 As such, prosecutors within the 
Ninth Circuit are bound by Theofel. However, the DOJ has 
taken the position that law enforcement elsewhere may 
continue to apply the traditional narrow interpretation of 
“electronic storage,” and obtain opened emails with a mere 
subpoena even when the data sought is held on servers located 
within the Ninth Circuit.89 
Many large ISPs take a different position. Some have 
argued that since their corporate headquarters are located 
within the Ninth Circuit, they must adhere to the Theofel 
precedent.90 Others have simply argued that they believe that 
Theofel is the correct interpretation of the law, and opened 
emails should not lose their protection under the law, 
regardless the location of the ISP or the requesting government 
                                                          
 85. 18 U.S.C. 2703(a) (2006). 
 86. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.; see generally Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored 
Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1208 (2004). 
 89. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND 
OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE MANUAL (Sep. 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ssmanual/03ssma.html. 
 90. U.S. v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769 (C.D. Ill. 2009) (“Microsoft asserts 
that because its headquarters are located within the Ninth Circuit, it must 
comply with Ninth Circuit precedent.”). 
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agency.91 In particular, both Microsoft and Yahoo! have refused 
to comply with subpoenas or 2703(d) orders for opened emails 
that are less than 181 days old and have argued their 
respective positions in court. In some cases, they have been 
successful, and, in others, they have not.92 
When ISPs receive a subpoena or 2703(d) order from 
outside the Ninth Circuit, they can either comply with the 
order or refuse and go to court. The companies that do refuse to 
comply with such orders rarely make this information public, 
and so it is exceeding difficult for consumers to easily evaluate 
an ISP’s willingness to fight for this issue. 
B. DELIVERING TO/FROM HEADERS IN RESPONSE TO SUBPOENAS 
FOR EMAIL MESSAGES 
ISPs have significant flexibility in pushing back against 
government requests when the law is vague. One such example 
of this relates to the delivery or scrubbing of to/from headers in 
email messages over 180 days old that are provided to the 
government in response to a subpoena. 
Section 2703(a) specifies that the government can use 
either a subpoena or a 2703(d) order to obtain the contents of 
email communications that are older than 180 days.93 Non-
content information,94 however, can only be obtained pursuant 
to either a search warrant or a 2703(d) order.95 Email headers 
                                                          
 91. Marc J. Zwillinger & Christian S. Genetski, Criminal Discovery of 
Internet Communications Under the Stored Communications Act: It’s Not A 
Level Playing Field, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 569, 580–581 (2007) 
(Despite continuing uncertainty as to the correctness of the Theofel reading of 
the backup storage provision, the decision in Theofel is followed by most major 
ISPs, who now require search warrants before producing any e-mail or private 
message content less than 180 days old.”); The ECPA, ISPs & Obtaining E-
mail: A Primer for Local Prosecutors, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE (July 
2005), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/ecpa_isps_obtaining_email_05.pdf 
(“State and local law enforcement should also be aware that several large ISPs 
such as AOL, Yahoo, and Hotmail are currently providing email content to law 
enforcement only pursuant to an ECPA warrant based on Theofel . . . 
regardless of the location of the requesting governmental entity, service of the 
process, or maintenance of the records.”). 
 92. See, e.g., Government’s Motion to Compel Compliance with 2703(d) 
Order at 3, In Re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2703(d), MISC NO 09Y080-CBS (D. Colo. Mar. 9, 2010), 
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/inreusaorder18/MotiontoCompel.pdf. 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006). 
 94. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(3) (2006). 
 95. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) specifies that “[a] governmental entity may require 
a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service to 
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have long been considered to be non-content (although this does 
not include the subject line), which the Ninth Circuit confirmed 
in United States v. Forrester.96 
As a result, Yahoo!, Google, and Microsoft have quietly 
established policies of scrubbing the “to” and “from” headers 
from email messages delivered to law enforcement agents in 
response to a subpoena.97 In such instances, if government 
officials wish to compel the disclosure of the headers from these 
three companies, they must first obtain a § 2703(d) order or 
search warrant. By taking this position, these ISPs have been 
able to force some degree of judicial review over a process that 
would otherwise bypass the courts. 
Multiple sources state that the DOJ does not favor the 
interpretation of ECPA adopted by these ISPs,98 but it has not 
                                                          
disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer 
of such service (not including the contents of communications) only when the 
governmental entity – obtains a warrant . . . [a 2703(d) order, or], has the 
consent of the subscriber or customer to such disclosure.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) 
(2006) (emphasis added). A few specific categories of customer records can be 
obtained with a subpoena. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2)(a) – (f), these 
are, “name; address; local and long distance telephone connection records, or 
records of session times and durations; length of service (including start date) 
and types of service utilized; telephone or instrument number or other 
subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily assigned network 
address; and means and source of payment for such service (including any 
credit card or bank account number).” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2)(a)–(f) (2006). 
 96. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[E]-
mail to/from addresses and IP addresses constitute addressing information 
and do not necessarily reveal any more about the underlying contents of 
communication than do phone numbers. When the government obtains the 
to/from addresses of a person’s e-mails or the IP addresses of websites visited, 
it does not find out the contents of the messages or know the particular pages 
on the websites the person viewed.”). 
 97. I have contacted representatives from most of the major ISPs, but 
none would comment on-the-record about their interpretation of ECPA. Al 
Gidari, a private attorney who represents several service providers confirmed 
the fact that some service providers do in fact scrub the to/from headers, 
although he would not reveal which particular providers do so. However, 
based on interviews with several other knowledgeable sources, I believe that 
the practice originated at Yahoo!, under the direction of Richard Salgado, the 
company’s legal compliance director. In 2010, Mr. Salgado left Yahoo! and 
went to work for Google. Shortly after he arrived at Google, the company 
adopted the same strict reading of ECPA that Yahoo! had pioneered. Microsoft 
adopted a similar policy in May of 2010, after I alerted a senior member of the 
company’s privacy team to the practices of Microsoft’s competitors. 
 98. E.g., Email from Richard Downing, Assistant Deputy Chief of the 
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Department of Justice, to 
Author  (Jan. 28, 2010, 9:36 AM) (on file with author) (refusing to comment).  I 
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gone to court to compel the delivery of these headers pursuant 
to a subpoena. It is unclear if the DOJ is worried about a 
negative ruling or if it wishes to avoid any public discussion 
about ISPs’ ability to adopt such policies, fearing that other 
ISPs might do so if they knew they could. 
It also remains unclear why Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft 
will not publicly confirm their interpretation of ECPA. As for 
the companies that still do not scrub the headers, there is likely 
a good reason why these companies refuse to admit it: the 
possibility of civil liability for improperly disclosing non-content 
communications information.99 
As a result of this industry-wide trend of not commenting 
on the practice, it is practically impossible for consumers to 
evaluate their ISPs’ positions on this obscure, yet important 
aspect of ECPA. 
C. VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 
While ECPA specifies the scenarios in which the 
government can compel an ISP to disclose its customers’ 
communications, it also provides for voluntary disclosure in so-
called exigent circumstances.100 
18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(8) and 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4) similarly 
permit the disclosure of communications content and non-
content:101 “[T]o a governmental entity, if the provider, in good 
faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or 
serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure 
without delay of communications relating to the emergency.”102 
This language has been repeatedly watered down over the 
past decade,103 often due to requests from telecommunications 
                                                          
am still waiting for the results of a related FOIA request for information. 
 99. See Quon v. Arch Wireless, 529 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008), cert 
denied sub nom, Mobility Wireless, Inc. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (U.S., 2009) 
(on the issue of liability under the Stored Communications Act), and rev’d sub 
nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4972 (U.S., June 17, 2010) (on 
the issue of validity of the search). The government may face additional 
administrative discipline measures under 18 U.S.C. § 2707(d). See 18 U.S.C. § 
2707(d) (2006) (discussing administrative discipline under § 2707). See also 18 
U.S.C. § 2712 (2006). 
 100. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7)(a) (2006) (discussing the production of information 
in emergency situations). 
 101. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(b)(8), 2702(c)(4) (2006). 
 102. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(8) (2006). 
 103. See, e.g., Seth Rosenbloom, Crying Wolf in the Digital Age:  Voluntary 
Disclosure under the Stored Communications Act, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
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carriers who do not want to be put in the position of evaluating 
the degree of the emergency.104 There is little case law on the 
emergency provisions, although  generally once a carrier 
receives a statement from the government certifying the 
emergency, it can disclose customers’ communications without 
the risk of liability.105 
Because the law does not require ISPs to tell their 
customers when their private communications or their non-
content data associated with their private communications are 
voluntarily disclosed to the government, the likelihood that 
consumers ever learn of disclosures is extremely low. 
Furthermore, few companies will publicly discuss the extent to 
which they receive emergency requests, and federal reporting 
requirements for such requests are largely worthless. 
Even so, it is clear that the practice is widespread. For 
example, of the 88,000 lawful requests and demands Verizon 
received from federal, state, and local officials in 2006, 25,000 
were requests for emergency assistance.106 Of these 25,000 
requests for emergency assistance, just 300 were from the 
federal government.107 Verizon has not released any statistics 
detailing with how many of these 25,000 emergency requests it 
                                                          
REV 529, 559–561 (2008). 
 104. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION’S USE OF EXIGENT LETTERS AND OTHER INFORMAL REQUESTS 
FOR TELEPHONE RECORDS, 261 n.272 (Jan. 2010) (quoting H.R. Rep No. 107-
497, at 12-13 (2002)),  available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s1001r.pdf  (“The legislative history of a 
similar amendment to Section 2702(b)’s emergency voluntary disclosure 
provision for content information suggests that the belief standard was 
relaxed because communications service providers ‘expressed concern to the 
Committee that the [reasonably believes] standard was too difficult for them 
to meet, and that as a result, providers may not disclose information relating 
to emergencies.’”); Milch, supra note 1; Luke O’Brien, AT&T, Verizon:  We 
Obeyed FBI “Emergency” Requests – 739 of Them, WIRED (Mar. 21, 2007, 12:35 
AM) http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/03/att_verizon_we (quoting 
statement of Walt Sharp, AT&T Spokesperson, “‘Failure to comply with an 
emergency request like this could endanger human life. We don’t feel it’s 
appropriate for a communications company to be second guessing a valid 
emergency request for assistance especially when it’s followed up with the 
appropriate documentation.’”). 
 105. See, e.g., Jayne v. Sprint PCS, No. CIV S-07-2522 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 
2009) (rejecting ECPA lawsuit against Sprint PCS based on exigent 
circumstances letter claiming that the plaintiff was a kidnapper and that the 
records were needed to identify and locate the suspect and rescue his victim). 
 106. Milch, supra note 1, at 5. 
 107. Id. 
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refused to comply. 
As the U.S. Internet Service Provider Association notes, 
“There is never an ‘emergency’ obligation on an ISP to 
disclose.”108 If a carrier refuses to disclose, the government can 
always obtain a subpoena, a 2703(d) order, or a search warrant 
and compel the company to disclose the information. As such, a 
company’s policy on emergency requests is one of the most 
useful indicators for its overall commitment to user privacy. 
Large ISPs and carriers often have vastly different policies 
when it comes to emergency requests, although none will 
publicly describe them.  Occasionally, however, information 
about these practices does leak. 
For example, in June 2009, an email message sent by a 
Florida police officer to others in the law enforcement 
community showed up on the wikileaks.org website.109 That 
email described the officer’s experiences interacting with 
several ISPs and telecommunication carriers during a recent 
child exploitation investigation.110 When presented with the 
same details describing the emergency situation, MySpace, 
Yahoo!, and AT&T all had differing responses. MySpace 
immediately delivered the requested IP login information. 
Yahoo! pushed back but eventually delivered IP logs, but only 
for logins that were more than 48 hours old. AT&T, however, 
refused to voluntarily provide any customer information in 
response to the officer’s request and only delivered the 
requested records after the police obtained a subpoena 
compelling disclosure.111 
The area of voluntary disclosure is one of the most 
interesting, yet poorly understood areas in which companies 
have complete and total control over the information they 
provide to law enforcement. Some companies, such as AT&T, 
                                                          
 108. U.S. Internet Serv. Provider Ass’n, Electronic Evidence Compliance—
A Guide for Internet Service Providers, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 945, 962 
(2003). 
 109. While it is difficult to guarantee that the email is not fictional, I have 
verified its authenticity with multiple well-informed sources. As such, I have 
reason to believe that the information contained within the email is valid. I 
have also attempted to get Yahoo! and AT&T to confirm the police officer’s 
statements, but my contacts at the companies were not willing confirm, on or 
off the record. Email from Mike Duffy, Special Agent, Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement, to Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force Email List 
(June 26, 2009, 11:28 EST) (on file with author). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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appear to have taken the position that, at least in some 
situations, they will not disclose information in emergencies. 
Other companies, such as Verizon, however, have argued in 
court that they have a First Amendment right to disclose their 
customers’ private information to the government. 
eBay’s Director of Compliance and Law Enforcement 
Relations revealed the extent to which his company goes out of 
its way to voluntarily assist the government, stating in 
comments at a conference in 2003: 
We [eBay] try to make rules to make it difficult for people to commit 
fraud and easy for you [law enforcement agencies] to investigate . . . 
eBay has probably the most generous policy of any internet company 
when it comes to sharing information. We do not require a subpoena 
except [sic] for very limited circumstances. We require a subpoena 
when we need the financial information from the site, credit card info 
or sometimes IP information . . . if you are [a] law enforcement agency 
you can fax us on your letterhead to request information: who is that 
beyond the seller ID, who is beyond this user ID. We give you their 
name, their address, their e-mail address and we can give you their 
sales history without a subpoena.112 
Since companies are unwilling to describe their policies for 
voluntary disclosure of customer data, consumers have no real 
way to determine this information ahead of time when they 
evaluate a potential service provider or carrier. Thus, for 
example, it is unclear if AT&T has a blanket policy of refusing 
emergency requests, if it only refuses certain kinds of 
emergency requests, or if their decision, described above, was 
simply an isolated instance. 
D. CHARGING THE GOVERNMENT FOR CONSUMERS’ PRIVATE 
DATA 
Many telecommunications companies and ISPs seek and 
typically receive payment from government agencies for the 
surveillance services they provide,113 a practice that the law 
                                                          
 112. eBay to Law Enforcement – We’re Here to Help, LAWMEME (Feb. 17, 
2003, 10:09 AM), 
http://lawmeme.research.yale.edu/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid
=925 (emphasis added). 
 113. If a provider sends the government agency an invoice for surveillance 
services, it does not mean the government agency will actually pay. “As part of 
our audit, we analyzed 990 telecommunication surveillance payments made by 
5 field divisions and found that over half of these payments were not made on 
time. We also found that late payments have resulted in telecommunications 
carriers actually disconnecting phone lines established to deliver surveillance 
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often permits.114 However, most firms opt to voluntarily waive 
the fees for certain types of investigations, and others have 
established policies of never charging for customer data. Such 
surveillance pricing decisions can have a major impact on the 
volume of government requests for data and on the breadth of 
data sought in each request. 
There appears to be an industry-wide policy to not seek 
compensation regarding surveillance and data disclosures 
associated with child exploitation investigations. This is not 
required by law but seems to stem both from a wish by firms to 
be good corporate citizens, as well as a realistic awareness of 
the awesome rhetorical power that the child exploitation issue 
carries in the broader debate over surveillance and data 
retention. Simply put, no company wants to be accused of doing 
anything to frustrate or profit from a child exploitation 
investigation. 
                                                          
results to the FBI, resulting in lost evidence including an instance where 
delivery of intercept information required by a Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) order was halted due to untimely payment.” OFFICE 
OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S MGT. OF 
CONFIDENTIAL CASE FUNDS AND TELECOMMUNICATION COSTS (Jan. 2008), 
available at  http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0803/index.htm. 
 114. Providers are prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 2706(c) from recovering the 
cost of producing phone records. 18 U.S.C. § 2706(c) (2006). It is also unclear if 
providers who insist on a Rule 41 order to deliver location information can 
seek compensation (this is a position several providers, such as Loopt have 
taken). See Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform:  Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 29 (2010) (statement of Albert Gidari, 
Partner, Perkins Cole LLP). However, providers can seek compensation for 
most other forms of surveillance assistance. For example,  18 U.S.C. § 2706(a) 
generally obligates government entities “obtaining the contents of 
communications, records, or other information under section 2702, 2703, or 
2704,” to pay the service provider “a fee for reimbursement for such costs as 
are reasonably necessary and which have been directly incurred in searching 
for, assembling, reproducing, or otherwise providing such information.” 18 
U.S.C. § 2706(a) (2006). Further,“[a]ny provider of wire or electronic 
communication service, landlord, custodian or other person furnishing such 
facilities or technical assistance shall be compensated therefore by the 
applicant for reasonable expenses incurred in providing such facilities or 
assistance.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (2006) (emphasis added). “[T]he Attorney 
General and the Director of National Intelligence may direct, in writing, an 
electronic communication service provider   to . . . immediately provide the 
Government with all information, facilities, or assistance necessary to 
accomplish the acquisition [and][t]he Government shall compensate, at the 
prevailing rate, an electronic communication service provider for providing 
information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with a directive issued 
pursuant to paragraph (1).”  50 U.S.C. §1881(a)(h)(1)-(2) (2006) (emphasis 
added). 
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In addition to the widespread practice of waiving charges 
for certain types of investigations, a small subset of companies 
never seek compensation, regardless of the type of crime being 
investigated. That is, regardless of if the request comes from 
local, state, or federal law enforcement or if it is a murder, 
terrorism, drug trafficking, or corporate fraud that is being 
investigated, these few technology firms have opted to provide 
their customers’ data to the government for free. While there 
may be other companies that have established such policies, at 
least MySpace, Facebook, and Microsoft do not charge. 
MySpace’s then-chief security officer confirmed that the 
company does not charge for the “thousands” of requests it 
receives from the government each year,115 while well-informed 
sources confirmed similar policies at both Facebook and 
Microsoft.116 
The impact of the decision to charge or not charge is 
significant, as telecommunications lawyer Al Gidari revealed 
recently in testimony before Congress: 
Service providers are prohibited by ECPA from recovering the cost of 
producing phone records, but service providers otherwise may recover 
costs reasonably necessary for the production of other subscriber 
information.  When records are ‘free,’ such as with phone records, law 
enforcement over-consumes with abandon.  Pen register print outs, for 
example, are served daily on carriers without regard to whether the 
prior day’s output sought the same records.  Phone record subpoenas 
often cover years rather than shorter, more relevant time periods.  
But when service providers charge for extracting data, such as log file 
searches, law enforcement requests are more tailored.117 
 
                                                          
 115. Interview with Hemanshu Nigam, Former Chief Sec. Officer, 
MySpace, in Washington D.C., (Feb. 4, 2010). I did not receive a reply to a 
follow-up email sent on the next day seeking information about the number of 
exigent requests the company receives, and the number of requests the 
company has refused to respond to. 
 116. Microsoft’s law enforcement manual does not mention any policy of 
seeking compensation. See Microsoft, supra note 70. A well-informed source 
told me that the company does not charge for the information it provides in 
response to most requests, but reserves the right to charge the government 
when the information sought is particularly burdensome. Another well-
informed source revealed that Facebook has a policy of not charging for 
government assistance, although its law enforcement manual does state the 
company reserves the right to do so. Facebook, supra note 74, at 2. 
 117. Hearing, supra note 100, at 29 (emphasis added). 
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E. PUBLISHING SURVEILLANCE PRICES 
Although many service providers charge the government 
for access to their customers’ data, few will publicly reveal the 
amount that they charge, if they charge anything at all. 
Cox Communications is the only telecommunications 
provider that lists its surveillance prices on a publicly 
accessible page on its website.118 However, the prices charged 
by several other companies have come to light over the past few 
years. Leaked law enforcement manuals for Yahoo!, Comcast, 
and Sprint detail the companies’ surveillance prices,119 while a 
letter sent by Verizon’s General Counsel to members of 
Congress confirmed that the firm routinely requests 
compensation for the assistance it provides to law enforcement 
(without including the actual prices).120 Likewise, Google’s head 
of public policy revealed in comments at a public event in 2009 
that the company requests compensation for the assistance it 
provides to the government.121 Some firms have also attempted 
to use legal threats (both implied and overt) in order to stop the 
publication of their surveillance prices. 
In September 2009, I filed Freedom of Information Act 
                                                          
 118. See Notice to Parties Serving Son Cox Communications, COX 
COMMUNICATIONS, http://www.cox.com/Policy/leainformation/default.asp (last 
updated Oct. 1, 2009). 
 119. “Upon lawful request and for a thousand dollars, Comcast, one of the 
nation’s leading telecommunications companies, will intercept its customers’ 
communications under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The cost for 
performing any FISA surveillance ‘requiring deployment of an intercept 
device’ is $1,000.00 for the ‘initial start-up fee (including the first month of 
intercept service),’ according to a newly disclosed Comcast Handbook for Law 
Enforcement (pdf). Thereafter, the surveillance fee goes down to ‘$750.00 per 
month for each subsequent month in which the original [FISA] order or any 
extensions of the original order are active.’ Steven Aftergood, Implementing 
Domestic Intelligence Surveillance,  SECRECY NEWS, (Oct. 15, 2007), 
http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2007/10/implementing_domestic_intellig.html. 
 120. “Verizon has received compensation for reasonable costs incurred in 
complying with interception orders . . . for effecting pen/traps . . . for providing 
stored communications and customer records . . . for providing assistance in 
effecting electronic surveillance under [FISA]  . . . and for effecting pen/traps 
under [FISA].” Milch supra note 1, at 10. 
 121. “At Computers, Freedom and Privacy last week, Google’s DC policy 
guru Alan Davidson revealed that the company has between 1-20 employees 
working full time to respond to requests for private customer information from 
law enforcement. He also revealed that Google asks for financial compensation 
from the Government for the time required to satisfy these requests -- he 
noted that this practice is permitted by law.”  Christopher Soghoian, A Shot 
Across the Bow, SLIGHT PARANOIA (June 10, 2009, 12:35 PM), 
http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2009/06/shot-across-bow.html. 
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(FOIA) requests with several government agencies for copies of 
ISP surveillance price lists. Verizon’s surveillance price list was 
among one of several documents in the possession of the U.S. 
Marshals Service that were responsive to my request. When 
given the opportunity to object to the disclosure of its price list, 
Verizon argued: 
[W]e do not want the general public to have access to these pricing 
schedules.  First, such information may confuse our customers . . . 
Other customers may, upon seeing the availability of certain services 
to law enforcement (such as wiretapping, for instance), become 
unnecessarily afraid that their lines have been tapped or call Verizon 
to ask if their lines are tapped (a question we cannot answer).122 
Responding to the same FOIA request, Yahoo!’s outside 
counsel was even more direct, stating: 
[T]he [pricing] information, if disclosed, would be used to “shame” 
Yahoo! and other companies -- and to “shock” their customers. 
Therefore, release of Yahoo!’s information is reasonably likely to lead 
to impairment of its reputation for protection of user privacy and 
security, which is a competitive disadvantage for technology 
companies.123 
When a copy of Yahoo!’s law enforcement guide (which 
includes the price list) surfaced on the Internet website 
cryptome.org in December 2009, Yahoo!’s outside counsel 
attempted (and failed) to force the removal of the document 
from the whistleblower website via a Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act notice.124 On the same day, Facebook sent me an 
email requesting that I remove a hyperlink from my personal 
Twitter account that linked to a copy of the company’s law 
enforcement handbook that was hosted on the official website 
                                                          
 122. Letter from Todd S. Schulman, Assistant General Counsel, Verizon, to 
Arleta D. Cunningham, U.S. Marshals Service (Sept. 14, 2009), available at 
http://files.cloudprivacy.net/verizon-price-list-letter.PDF. 
 123. Letter from Michael T. Gershberg, Counsel to Yahoo! Inc, to William 
Bordley, U.S. Marshals Service (Sept. 15, 2009), available at 
http://files.cloudprivacy.net/yahoo-price-list-letter.PDF. 
 124. See Yahoo!, supra note 71; Letter from Michael T. Gershberg, 
Attorney, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, to John Young, Cryptome, at (Dec. 2, 2009), 
available at http://www.eff.org/files/yahoo-demand.pdf. Yahoo!’s attempt to 
halt the spread of its price list was, by all estimates, a complete failure – the 
takedown led to significant media attention, both on the Internet and TV. See 
Zetter, supra note 102; The Colbert Report:  The Word – Spyvate Sector 
(Comedy Central broadcast Dec. 16, 2009),  available at 
http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/258582/december-16-
2009/the-word---spyvate-sector. 
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of the Wisconsin State Public Defender.125 Although I ignored 
their request, the file soon disappeared from the Wisconsin 
State Public Defender website, presumably after the office was 
also contacted by Facebook. 
IV. ENCOURAGING COMPANIES TO COMPETE ON 
PRIVACY 
As the preceding two sections demonstrate, there are 
several ways that telecommunications and Internet companies 
differ on practical privacy issues. If these firms chose to do so, 
they could actually compete on these meaningful differences, 
giving their customers another data point by which to compare 
their product offerings.  However, for companies to be able to 
effectively compete on the degree to which they facilitate or 
resist government access to their customers’ data, they must 
first be willing to publicly discuss their own policies. Simply 
put, for there to be effective competition on privacy, consumers 
(assisted by public interest groups and the media) need to be 
able to evaluate and compare each company’s approach to 
government access. 
Unfortunately, it is likely that most firms will vigorously 
resist any efforts to make such information public, particularly 
those firms that have adopted policies designed to assist the 
government (in some cases, for free and, in other cases, at a 
price). As such, any effort to force transparency in this area will 
likely occur in spite of most of the providers, rather than with 
their assistance. How can this information be freed and 
delivered to consumers to create a market for privacy? 
This section will first briefly explore the existing 
surveillance statistics that have been made public, including 
those pursuant to specific statutory requirements and those 
that have been voluntarily provided by telecommunications and 
Internet providers. While these statistics are often useful for 
informing the general public about the extent of the 
government’s surveillance activities, they do little to enable 
effective competition between individual providers. 
The second half of this section will propose specific ways in 
which companies can be forced to provide meaningful 
information that will actually promote competition in the area 
of government access to end-user data. 
                                                          
 125. Email from Jeff Wu, Facebook, to Author (Dec. 2, 2010, 4:31 PM) (on 
file with author). 
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A. GOVERNMENT COMPILED AGGREGATE SURVEILLANCE 
STATISTICS 
Each year since 1997, the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts has compiled and published a detailed report on the 
number of law enforcement wiretaps and other electronic 
intercepts that occurred at both the state and federal level in 
the previous year. The report is extraordinary in its high-level 
of quality126 and in its detail in revealing the number of 
wiretaps requested and approved on a city/county scale, the 
kind of interception (phone, computer, pager, fax), the number 
of people whose communications were intercepted, the number 
of intercepted messages, the number of arrests and convictions 
that resulted from the interception, and the financial cost of the 
wiretap.127 
Likewise, the DOJ is required at least once a year to 
submit several surveillance-related reports to Congress, 
including: a report regarding the use of pen registers and trap 
& trace devices by law enforcement agencies within the DOJ,128 
a report detailing the number of emergency disclosures of the 
contents of communications to the DOJ by ISPs,129 a report 
detailing the number of applications made by the Government 
to conduct electronic surveillance and/or physical searches 
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,130 the number 
of “Section 215” requests for business records and tangible 
things for foreign intelligence purposes,131 and the number of 
national security letters sent by the FBI.132 
As detailed as the Wiretap Report is, it lacks one key bit of 
information: the names of the telecommunications carriers that 
received and complied with the intercept orders. The reports 
compiled by the DOJ similarly lack carrier information, 
                                                          
 126. 145 Cong. Rec. 31,311 (1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“The AO has 
done an excellent job of preparing the wiretap reports.”). 
 127. 18 U.S.C. § 2519(2)−(3) (2006) (outlining what the intercepted 
communications report issued by the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts must contain). 
 128. 18 U.S.C. § 3126 (2006). 
 129. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(d) (2006). 
 130. 50 U.S.C. § 1807 (2006); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(1)(d) (2006). 
 131. See The USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272 
(2001) (expanding the authority of the FBI to compel disclosure of certain 
business records under 50 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)). 
 132. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(e) (2006). 
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although this is less of an immediate problem because these 
reports are not even made available to the general public. 
These reports may provide academics, privacy activists, 
and those in Congress with a partial sense of the scale of 
modern surveillance, at least at the federal level. However, 
they lack sufficient information to enable consumers to learn 
about the privacy practices of the companies to whom they 
entrust their private communications. 
B. COMPANY PROVIDED SURVEILLANCE STATISTICS 
Over the past few years, a small number of service 
providers have voluntarily published statistics regarding the 
extent to which they receive government requests. But as far as 
I am aware, no company has disclosed the extent to which it 
responds to or rejects those requests. 
AOL was the first company to voluntarily disclose 
statistics, revealing to the New York Times in 2006 that it 
received 1000 requests per month.133 In 2007, in response to a 
query from several members of Congress, Verizon provided 
detailed information regarding the requests it had received 
from government agencies, which averaged 90,000 per year.134 
In 2009, a representative from Facebook told Newsweek that it 
was receiving between ten to twenty requests from police per 
day.135 Finally, in response to a copyright lawsuit in 2010, cable 
giant Time Warner revealed that it was receiving 
approximately 500 IP address lookup requests per month on 
average, nearly all of which come from law enforcement.136 
None of these companies have provided updated statistics since 
their initial disclosures. 
                                                          
 133. Saul Hansell, Online Trail Can Lead to Court, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 
2006), at C1 (“AOL, for example, has more than a dozen people, including 
several former prosecutors, handling the nearly 1,000 requests it receives each 
month for information in criminal and civil cases . . . . AOL says that only 30 
of the 1,000 monthly requests it receives are for civil cases, and that it initially 
rejects about 90 percent of those, arguing that they are overly broad or that 
the litigants lack proper jurisdiction. About half of those rejected are 
resubmitted, on narrower grounds.”). 
 134. Milch, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
 135. Nick Summers, Walking the Cyberbeat, NEWSWEEK (May 18, 2009), 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/195621. 
 136. Nate Anderson, Time Warner Cable Tries to Put Brakes on Massive 
Piracy Case, ARS TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2010/05/time-warner-cable-tries-to-put-brakes-on-massive-piracy-
case.ars (last updated May 2010). 
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In April 2010, Google announced its new Government 
Requests Tool, which reveals the number of government 
requests for user data that the company received between July 
1, 2009 and December 31, 2009 broken down by country.137 
While the initial data set only covers a single six month period, 
Google pledged to update it twice per year going forward.138 
Google’s release of this information instantly set a gold 
standard for transparency regarding government requests, far 
surpassing the previous efforts of its competitors. However, the 
company acknowledges that it is difficult to draw any 
conclusions from the limited data it has released: 
Requests may ask for data about a number of different users or just 
one user. A single request may ask for several types of data (for 
example, basic subscriber information or contents of emails) but be 
valid only for one type and not for another; in those cases, we disclose 
only the information we believe we are legally required to share. 
Given all this complexity, we haven’t figured out yet how to categorize 
and quantify these requests in a way that adds meaningful 
transparency, but we plan to in the future.139 
Until the release of this data, Google had long maintained 
a policy, like many other Internet companies, of not 
commenting on the number of requests it receives from 
government agencies.140 The reason for this widespread secrecy 
appears to be a fear that such information may scare users and 
give them reason to fear that their private information is not 
safe.141 
C. THE CURRENT STATISTICS ARE LACKING 
Both the currently released official surveillance 
government statistics and the statistics voluntarily provided by 
                                                          
 137. David Drummond, Greater Transparency Around Government 
Requests, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Apr. 20, 2010, 11:04 AM), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/04/greater-transparency-around-
government.html. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Transparency Report: FAQ, GOOGLE.COM, 
http://www.google.com/governmentrequests/overview.html (last visited Oct. 
15, 2010). 
 140. E.g., Declan McCullagh, How Safe Is Instant Messaging? A Security 
and Privacy Survey, CNET NEWS  (June 9, 2008, 4:00 AM), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-9962106-38.html; Ryan Singel, Google, 
Microsoft Push Feds to Fix Privacy Laws, WIRED (Mar. 30, 2010, 4:38 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/03/google-microsoft-ecpa. 
 141. See Singel, supra note 140. 
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companies do little to enable consumers (and their proxies, 
such as public interest groups and the media) to determine 
which companies most effectively protect their customers’ 
privacy. For example, Verizon received 88,000 government 
requests in 2006,142 while Google received 3,000 requests over 
six months in 2009.143 Does this mean that Verizon is a worse 
company for privacy or a better one? It is impossible to know. 
Missing from these numbers are details on the number of 
requests that each company refused to comply with, the 
number of voluntary disclosures, the amount of data that was 
eventually disclosed, and the number of customers whose data 
was delivered. 
In order to stimulate a market for effective corporate 
resistance to government access, surveillance statistics need to 
reveal the activities and policies over which the carriers and 
providers actually have some degree of control. Specifically, 
information that could help consumers determine the extent to 
which their provider protects their privacy includes: 
1.The number of emergency requests the company received, in 
which no subpoena, court order, or other legal process was 
submitted; 
2.The number of emergency requests that the company rejected 
and the number with which it complied; 
3.The number of instances in which the company refused to 
comply with a demand for information and went to court to 
quash the order; 
4.The kind of information sought (prospective/real time or 
historical). In the event that logs or other stored information 
is sought, the age of the information disclosed to the 
government for each request; and 
5.The number of instances in which the company had nothing 
useful to deliver due to data deletion policies or due to the 
use of encryption for which it does not have the key. 
D. STATE GOVERNMENTS CAN FORCE THE DISCLOSURE OF 
SURVEILLANCE DATA 
Over the last several decades, Congress has repeatedly 
expanded the ability for law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies to obtain individuals’ private data, lowered the 
                                                          
 142. Milch, supra note 1, at 5. 
 143. Ryan Singel, Google: U.S. Demanded User Info 3,500 Times in 6 
Months, WIRED (Apr. 20, 2010, 1:12 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/04/google-warrants-
transparency/#comments. 
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evidentiary threshold required to get it, and permitted the 
large-scale collection of such sensitive information without 
judicial oversight. 
Because of this consistent trend, I hold the rather 
pessimistic view that Congress is unlikely to pass any 
legislation aimed at encouraging companies to say no to 
government agencies’ requests for customers’ data. However, 
the federal government is not the only avenue for legislative 
action —often, change starts with the states.144 
For example, over the past several years, forty-six states 
have adopted data breach statutes, all following California’s 
lead in 2003.145 This is, of course, a great example of states 
acting to protect their citizens when the federal government is 
unwilling or unable. Furthermore, these benefits are not 
limited to just the residents of the states that pass such laws. 
For example, in 2004, data broker ChoicePoint suffered a 
significant data breach.146 Soon enough, ChoicePoint admitted 
that it had suffered a breach that impacted individuals from 
across the country.147 
States can play a significant role in shining light upon 
companies’ surveillance practices. Furthermore, Americans 
from all fifty states, as well as consumers around the world, can 
free-ride and receive similar benefits, even if just one or two 
states act. 
As such, I present the following policy proposals, which 
could be implemented by any state (although, ideally by 
California, given how many Internet service and application 
providers are based there): 
                                                          
 144. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J. dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system 
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”). 
 145. State Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/TelecommunicationsInformationTechnolog
y/SecurityBreachNotificationLaws/tabid/13489/Default.aspx (last updated 
Apr. 12, 2010). 
 146. Gary Rivlin, Keeping Your Enemies Close, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2006), 
available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/12/business/yourmoney/12choice.html?_r=1&
ref=choicepoint-inc. 
 147. Id. 
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1.Require that companies disclose their data retention policies, 
including the details and any limitations of the methods 
used for data deletion or anonymization policies. 
2.Require that companies disclose their policy for the voluntary 
disclosure of information, including the standards used to 
evaluate emergency situations. 
3.Require that companies calculate statistics on the number of 
requests they receive from law enforcement each year and 
the number of individuals or accounts whose information is 
requested, the legal process accompanying the request, the 
number of times the company refuses to or discloses the 
information sought, and the type of user data sought and 
disclosed. For these statistics, the companies should disclose 
the relevant numbers for the state, as well as a nationwide 
total. 
4.Require that companies disclose the amount of money, if any, 
they charge the government for responding to requests for 
user data and the degree to which the company makes a 
profit from such disclosures. 
Should at least one state mandate such disclosures, those 
companies that go out of their way to assist the government 
would be clearly identified, as well as those that put their 
customers’ privacy first. At that point, consumers would be free 
to include this information in their purchasing decisions, and 
hopefully, spur a real market for privacy. 
E. A ROLE FOR THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
“Consumers need to understand how the information they share will 
be used, so that they can make informed decisions about whether to 
share it in the first place.”148 
 
The United States is unique among western countries in 
that its primary privacy regulator, the FTC, is entirely focused 
on privacy violations by companies but not the government. 
Contrast this to Europe and Canada, where privacy 
commissioners are free to comment on matters of government 
surveillance. For example, in the same month, Canada’s 
Privacy Commissioner condemned the proposed rollout of full-
body scanners at airports149 and launched an investigation into 
                                                          
 148. David Vladeck, Dir., FTC Bureau of Consumer Prot., Remarks at New 
York University: Promoting Consumer Privacy: Accountability and 
Transparency in the Modern World (Oct. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/vladeck/091002nyu.pdf. 
 149. Jennifer Stoddart, Op-Ed., Airport Security Scanners Must Respect 
Privacy, Privacy Commissioner Insists, OFFICE PRIVACY COMM’R CAN., Jan. 
2010, http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2010/op-ed_100107_e.cfm. 
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Facebook’s privacy flaws.150 Contrast this to the United States, 
where, for several years, every privacy activist, public interest 
group, and civil liberties-inclined member of Congress railed 
against the National Security Agency’s warrantless 
wiretapping program—yet, the FTC did not comment on, or 
involve itself in, the matter. The reason, of course, was the 
FTC’s strict mandate to regulate unfair and deceptive business 
practices. The activities of the NSA, the FBI, and the DOJ, no 
matter how illegal, are strictly outside the FTC’s regulatory 
authority. 
Even though the FTC cannot stop other government 
agencies from intruding upon or violating the privacy of 
Americans, it may be able to play a role in regulating the 
companies that go out of their way to assist government 
agencies in their data collection activities, at least when those 
firms simultaneously promise to protect their users’ privacy. 
Since the FTC’s first privacy cases in 2004, a consistent 
enforcement hook for the agency has been the privacy policies 
that both the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA)151 and California’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 
2003 (OPPA)152 required companies to post on their websites. If 
a company claims to do something in its privacy policy and it 
does not do so (or does not do so sufficiently), the FTC is able to 
act. 
The most relevant of the FTC’s privacy cases is the Tower 
Records settlement from 2004.153 In that case, the company’s 
privacy policy claimed that “TowerRecords.com takes steps to 
ensure that your information is treated securely . . . [and] 
[o]nce we receive your transmission, we make our best effort to 
ensure its security on our systems.”154 When the company 
failed to protect end users’ data from hackers, the FTC argued 
that Tower had failed to: 
[I]mplement appropriate checks and controls on the process of writing 
and revising Web applications; adopt and implement policies and 
                                                          
 150. Press Release, Office of the Privacy Comm’r of Canada, Privacy 
Commissioner Launches New Facebook Probe (Jan. 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2010/nr-c_100127_e.cfm. 
 151. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2006). 
 152. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (Deering 2010). 
 153. See Complaint, In re MTS, Inc., 137 F.T.C. 444 (May 28, 2004) (No. 
032-3209). 
 154. Id. at 454. 
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procedures regarding security tests for its Web applications; and 
provide appropriate training and oversight for their employees 
regarding Web application vulnerabilities and security testing.”155 
According to the Commission, the disparity between the 
security failure and the assurances given in Tower’s privacy 
policy constituted “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” in 
violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act.156 
As the proceeding sections of this article have 
demonstrated, companies have a significant amount of 
flexibility in the way that they design their systems and in the 
interpretations of ECPA that they adopt. Furthermore, as the 
quotes and facts included earlier demonstrate, Google, 
Microsoft, Verizon, and AT&T have all opted to put their desire 
to assist the government above their customers’ privacy 
interests. However, these firms also make prominent 
statements about their commitment to protecting their 
customer privacy. No mention is made in their respective 
privacy policies about their belief that the government’s 
interest in conducting investigations comes first. 
These firms, as well as others in the industry, should be 
free to design their products in any way they wish, and, where 
the law permits, they should be free to voluntarily assist the 
government in any way they choose. What they should not be 
permitted to do, however, is to proclaim their commitment to 
protecting their customers’ privacy and then actively subvert it 
by designing their systems to put the government’s interests 
first. 
The bold promises by these companies mislead consumers 
about a material aspect of each firms’ data and privacy policies, 
and the degree to which the consumers’ information is 
protected. As such, the FTC can and should stop these 
companies from falsely claiming to protect their customers’ 
privacy. 
I acknowledge that the FTC’s involvement in this area 
would be controversial and fraught with political risk, a very 
real concern for an agency that has had its budget slashed by 
Congress in the past in response to a belief by many in 
Congress that it had wandered beyond its mandate.157 
                                                          
 155. Id. at 448. 
 156. Id. at 449. 
 157. See, e.g., Haoran Lu, Presidential Influence on Independent 
Commissions: A Case of FTC Staffing Levels, 28 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q., 51, 
54–56. 
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As such, my proposal is only that the FTC prohibit these 
firms from making unqualified statements about their 
commitment to user privacy and not that the FTC force these 
firms to actually adopt privacy enhancing technologies and 
policies. These companies should simply have to tell their 
customers the truth—that their privacy is not as important as 
maintaining the government’s investigative abilities. 
Were the FTC to enforce such truth in privacy statements, 
it could have a significant stimulating effect on the market for 
privacy enhancing services, and consumers might for the first 
time be able to easily evaluate potential service providers based 
on these statements. There are, of course, many Americans who 
seem to support the government’s desire to freely spy on its 
citizens, and these consumers would be able to easily identify 
companies whose policies match their own beliefs. On the other 
hand, consumers who value their privacy and civil liberties 
would be able to identify the service providers who are most 
committed to protecting their private information from 
government intrusion. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although many companies claim to value and protect 
privacy, this article clearly demonstrates that this is simply not 
the case, at least with regard to government access to user 
data. Although companies have significant flexibility in 
designing their products to be resistant to the government, few 
take the steps to do so; yet, most continue to tout their 
commitment to protecting user data. 
As a result of this lack of accurate information about 
companies’ practices, there is no functioning market for this 
kind of privacy. Consumers have no way to evaluate each firm’s 
practices and, as such, may entrust information to these firms 
that they otherwise might not have had they known the 
circumstances in which the company might voluntarily provide 
it to the government. 
If a healthy market for privacy existed, consumers would 
be able to vote with their dollars. The large numbers of 
Americans who are willing to sacrifice their civil liberties in the 
government’s never-ending fight against terror would be able to 
steer their dollars to firms that share that belief. On the other 
hand, Americans who value their privacy and distrust the 
government would be able to easily determine which firms 
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match their own beliefs. Ideally, such transparency would push 
companies to follow consumer preferences—either for more 
disclosure to the government or less. Without action, we will 
never get such transparency and competition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
